Good News from Chile

Nowadays, as Latin America is going through several changes, even turmoil, news about problems, crises etc. dominate the agenda. However, there are also good events that do not receive that much of attention. I could go on and on about why bad news prevail over good news in the agenda, but this is not the topic of this post. Instead, I would like to highlight a favorable event that took place two weeks ago in Chile.

Last August 11, 2008, Michelle Bachelet signed the “Ley sobre Transparencia de la Funcion Publica y Acceso a la Informacion de los Organos de la Administración del Estado”(see here). In doing so, Chile becomes the latest country in the region (and the world) to adopt Access to Information (ATI) Legislation (it might also be longest title for an ATI Law). After a long journey, with remarkable efforts from civil society as well as the emblematic case Claude M. Reyes y Otros vs Chile at the Inter American Human Rights Court, Chile can officially claim that there is an ATI Law. Congratulations to Chile and to the organizations and people that pushed several years in this direction.

But why is this a good thing for Chile? Well, first of all, given that access to public information is recognized as a human right by the Declaration of Human Rights, as well as the American Convention on Human Rights, it is important to have legislation to regulate this right. Furthermore, as an instrument, its exercise changes the relationship between the government and the governed, by empowering the latter with information on the actions and performance of the former. In addition, it fosters accountability, good governance and development. Since Latin America is not a region characterized by strong accountability systems, good governance (see World Governance Indicators) and staggering development, this kind of laws can set the ground for improvements.

Chile, with their brand new law join Mexico, Peru, Ecuador, Dominican Republic, Panama, Honduras, Nicaragua in the club of countries with ATI Law in Latin America. However, as it is clear now, having a law is not the end but the beginning, as the implementation phase poses several challenges.

It seems that the Chilean legislation is ambitious and it is generating expectations (see here), while the government has showed political will (see here), setting a sound base for an effective implementation. Time will tell if they manage to do so. In the meantime, I only hope for this to happen.

A successful implementation of the Chilean ATI Law will of course be beneficial for Chile, however, I believe this would also help to build momentum around the topic in the region, particularly the Southern Cone and Brazil, thus enhancing the chances for success of initiatives and current efforts these countries. Furthermore, having Chile’s ATI experience as a good practice will provide another reference point in the region, besides Mexico, demonstrating the importance of these laws and its proper implementation.

Si se puede

Recientemente tuve la oportunidad de estar en la ciudad de Medellín, Colombia. Una urbe de casi 2 millones y medio de personas la cual está sin lugar a dudas a la vanguardia en cuanto a desarrollo y prosperidad. Pude pasearme por sus calles, tanto en el día como en altas horas de la noche y constatar la belleza y la tranquilidad con que se vive en la capital de Antioquia. Actualmente cuenta con una gran vida cultural, ambiente nocturno, buena comida, sin mencionar su larga tradición como importante centro económico dentro de Colombia. Y se está convirtiendo en una ciudad de talla internacional, prueba de ello son tanto la Asamblea General de la OEA, celebrada a principios de junio pasado y las reuniones del BID que se llevarán a cabo el próximo año. En pocas palabras Medellín es una ciudad muy agradable para visitar, y también para vivir con tranquilidad.

Aún para cualquier persona que desconozca la historia reciente de Medellín, no me cabe la menor duda que la ciudad dejaría una muy grata sensación. Sin embargo, la infame historia alrededor del Medellín de los 80´s y 90´s es sumamente conocida, hecho que multiplica, para bien, el impacto que la ciudad causó en mi, y seguramente en muchos viajeros hoy día. Si bien, los detalles precisos se nos pueden escapar a la mayoría de las personas, poca gente no ha oído hablar del Cártel de Medellín, o de los atentados de las FARC, los conflictos de los paramilitares, en fin, para un ciudadano enterado de las noticias a principios de los 90´s, Medellín era una zona de guerras y violencia que debía ser evitada a toda costa.

En el transcurso de alrededor de 10 años, Medellín ha logrado salir de un infierno de violencia para convertirse en un faro de desarrollo tanto económico como social y humano, el cual ha sido recientemente mencionado por el Washington Post en un extenso artículo al respecto.

Casi un mes antes de publicado el artículo sobre Medellín, el mismo Washington Post publicó otro extenso artículo sobre Tijuana, México. Siendo oriundo de Baja California (estado donde se encuentra Tijuana) me dolió ver en la primera plana del Post el encabezado “Tijuana Strip Turns Ghostly in Wake of Drug Violence”. Si bien me impactó que estuviera en la primera página del Post, el contenido no era nada nuevo. De todos conocida es la espiral de violencia que se vive actualmente en México, y más fuertemente en ciudades como Tijuana, Ciudad Juárez, Culiacán entre otras. Esta situación la pude sentir en carne propia en un viaje a dicho estado donde era claro el ambiente de inseguridad y miedo en que viven familiares y amigos.

Y yo justo que venía regresando de Medellín.

La experiencia colombiana, pues hay que reconocer que no solo Medellín sino otras ciudades como Bogotá han tenido resurgimientos espectaculares, indica que hay esperanza. Si en Colombia se pudo llevar a cabo esta transformación en una década, de alguna forma se puede empezar el proceso de cambio. Habrá quien diga que son contextos diferentes, que no se pueden extrapolar las lecciones aprendidas, que en Colombia tocaron fondo y desde ahí se levantaron, mientras en México no hemos tocado fondo, etc. Sin embargo, la prueba de que se pueden hacer cambios sustanciales en un período corto ahí está, tomando las medidas correctas.

Barack on the Americas

For those of you who haven't had the opportunity to see this yet, and I can't imagine there are many of you reading this blog who haven't, here it is. The Democratic nominee for President on his vision for the Americas:

Desigualdad Tecnológica

Justo esta semana como parte de mi trabajo estuve en Nicaragua para coordinar el dictado de un taller en periodismo online a periodistas nicaragüenses. Debo decir que la coordinación y el dictado del taller fueron por demás complicadas tanto por la falta de infraestructura y recursos en dicho país, como por el paro nacional de trasnportistas. Sin embargo, el mayor desafío provino del hecho que el taller lo impartimos en Bluefields, una pequeña ciudad de la Costa Atlántica (en realidad es el Caribe, no el océano Atlántico) marginada de los vaivenes de la capital (no así del paro).

Para realizar este taller tuvimos que lidiar con una serie de obstáculos, unos previsibles, otros no, tales como una esporádica (y lenta) conexión a internet, fundamental para cursos de periodismo online; un calor sofocante en el aula; una barrera de idioma, ya que en Bluefields, la gente habla una mezcla curiosa de inglés y español, entre otros. Sin lugar a dudas, y a pesar de los obstáculos, el esfuerzo valió la pena. Un grupo de periodistas oriundos de una zona sumamente marginada de Nicaragua recibieron capacitación en ciertas técnicas que seguramente les ayudaran en el ejercicio de su profesión. Sin embargo, la experiencia que este taller implicó, además de orgullo, generó en mí una serie de reflexiones sobre la desigualdad económica reflejada en la cada vez más amplia brecha tecnológica, y el impacto de esta en el ejercicio de los derechos democráticos en Latinoamérica.

No es un secreto la gran desigualdad que prevalece en la región; en Latinoamérica hay pobres muy pobres, pero también hay ricos muy ricos (dicho sea de paso, que el hombre más rico del mundo sea un latinoamericano me parece ofensivo en un continente con tantos millones de pobres). Esta desigualdad permea la mayoría de los ámbitos de la vida pública. Hay desigualdad económica, desigualdad en el acceso a la justicia, desigualdad educativa, desigualdad en la representación política y desigualdad en el acceso a y uso de la tecnología, particularmente en el acceso a tecnologías de la comunicación e información. En países como Costa Rica, Chile, o Peru o Argentina, los usuarios de internet por cada 100 habitantes, apenas sobrepasan los 20 usuarios. Ya no se diga países como Honduras, Bolivia o Nicaragua, los cuales no llegan ni a 5 usuarios por 100 habitantes (http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=internet+users&d=CDB&f=srID%3a29969). Aun así, estas cifras no tienen el mismo impacto hasta que uno se enfrenta con la realidad de las zonas marginadas en los países de nuestra región, cuando uno debe, a mitad del taller, ayudar a varios participantes a obtener su primer cuenta de correo electrónico en gmail.

Esta desigualdad tecnológica converge con una tendencia mundial la cual busca impulsar los llamados e-governments o gobiernos electrónicos. Estos esfuerzos son sin lugar a dudas liderados por los países desarrollados, sin embargo, grandes cantidades de dinero (de los gobiernos, agencias de cooperación internacional etc) están siendo canalizadas hacia el desarrollo de las capacidades informáticas de los gobiernos, para así facilitar el ejercicio de los derechos democráticos, así como el cumplimiento de ciertas obligaciones con el estado.

Es innegable que las tecnologías de comunicación tienen un gran potencial para facilitar el ejercicio de dichos derechos, tales como el monitoreo de la gestión social y la rendición de cuentas, así como el pago de impuestos, registros públicos etc. Sin embargo, el estar frente a semejantes carencias tecnológicas en la Costa Atlántica nicaragüense, me hizo reflexionar sobre el impacto que el uso de la tecnología en la vida democrática puede tener en sociedades altamente desiguales como las latinoamericanas.

Imaginemos un escenario donde la información pública corre a gran velocidad por el internet, donde gran parte de los trámites se deben hacer a través de esta, cosa que no es totalmente remota, aún en los países latinoamericanos. Siguiendo en este ejercicio mental, supongamos que la desigualdad tecnológica continúa creciendo. El resultado de estas dos tendencias sería una gran población ya marginada, cuyos niveles de exclusión se incrementarían considerablemente al no poder acceder a las herramientas que les permitan practicar sus derechos y cumplir con sus obligaciones.

En ninguna manera esto es una crítica para la tecnificación de los gobiernos, al contrario, el internet tiene un potencial enorme. Lo que debe ser tomado en cuenta es la necesidad de acompañar estos procesos de tecnificación con políticas que desarrollen la infraestructura y el acceso a la tecnología para los sectores marginados. Estas políticas deberían incluir, además de infraestructura, campañas de alfabetización tecnológica. De esta forma las posibilidades que brinda la tecnología podrán ser aprovechadas por la población en general, y no solo por los sectores acomodados, contribuyendo así al desarrollo de sociedades más equitativas.

Hidden Benefit of Non-Consecutive Terms?

With the Presidential election in the Dominican Republic to be held on May 16, all indications point to a win for PLD incumbent Leonel Fernandez. He has consistently polled well ahead of main opponent Miguel Vargas Maldonado of the PRD, and at this point the big question seems to be whether he can pull off a first round win (must get 50% +1) or have to face a second round.




Rather than look at the race, I'm more interested in discussing the fact that Fernandez is poised to be democratically elected to a third (but not all consecutive) presidential term. As far as I can tell, this is unprecedented in the course of recent democratization in the region. Fujimori was elected to three terms, but did it through trashing the party system. And he of course famously resigned (via fax from Japan) before a year was out in the third term. Garcia (Peru), Preval (Haiti), Ortega (Nicaragua), Arias (Costa Rica), and Fernandez are all currently serving second, non-consecutive terms. Uribe may very well successfully push constitutional reform to allow himself to serve a third consecutive term, but that's a few years down the road.


Fernandez first took office in 1996, served through 2000, took a term off, and returned to the presidency in 2004. This means that when he finishes his prospective third term in 2012, he will have been in the political limelight for 16 years. I wonder what effect these "off-terms" and non-consecutive terms have upon the overall political leadership climates of a given country. I imagine that those former-but-possible-future-Presidents stay very much informed and involved in what's going on, especially in their respective parties. In any case, a guy like Fernandez is not going to fade away, especially if there exists the prospect of a third term. Imagine what Bill Clinton would have been up to after 2000 if he could have run again in 2004 or 2008.
So I suppose that these off-terms allow politicians like Fernandez and Arias to reflect upon their presidencies, and hopefully gain some perspective on what could be done better. This is probably by design. But taking a term or two off, in theory at least, also motivates the politician to stay in touch with the people in the hopes of serving as executive once again. I think Ortega is a good example. Whether or not you agree with his politics, style, or dubious means of winning the presidency in 2006, he remained on the political scene after his presidency in the hopes of returning to office. So it would be in the interest of former presidents looking to regain the presidency after an off-term or two to keep in tune with what's happening both politically and in the pueblo, to maintain a reserve of popular support in a future election (as Ortega did, constitutional change notwithstanding).
In theory, they could also serve as an advocate for the people, and even potentially playing the role of a reputable, but unofficial "check" to the powers that be. With the proper outlook and motivations, this could be a valuable service to developing democracies, especially those struggling with caudillo leadership and/or one party dominance in the executive and legislative branches (think Bolivia).


I recently visited George Washington's home at Mount Vernon, Virginia. Washington, it should be noted, was not only the the "father" of the United States, but also the father of term limits. He chose to resign from the presidency after two terms, setting the unwritten precedent that US presidents would follow for the next 130 years or so. Two consecutive terms sounds about right to me, but allowing another consecutive term after some off-years may have benefits for developing democracies beyond what is usually considered.

Leadership Crisis in Haiti

As I write, Haiti is once again facing a leadership crisis. Short re-cap: protests the began on April 3 to air greivances about the rising cost of living turned violent, bringing upheaval to the capital and third largest city, Les Cayes. Receiving the brunt of the criticism is Prime Minister Alexis, who has been the face and mouthpiece of the government in the past few months regarding the cost of living crisis. Of particular concern for Hatians is the rising cost of staple foods - rice, beans, and cooking oil have seen up to 50% price increases in the past few months. This is no small matter in a country where most of the population struggles to get by on less than $2 per day. Although the violence that broke out during the protests is thought to be instigated by individuals with political and criminal agendas (rather than out of concern for the price of rice), and that violence has captutred recent headlines, this should not overshadow the primacy of the orginal message of the protests. Namely that Haitians are hungry, and the government has done nothing to help them.

As I write, PM Alexis is facing the prospect of either accepting the Senate's request for his resignation, or face a vote of no-confidence in the Senate, scheduled f0r 11:00 Saturday. There's a good chance that by the afternoon Alexis will be out - if if he does not resign, enough Senators necessary to vote him out have signed a letter stating that they would. The question remains, however, whether this coalition will remain disciplined enough to do so.

My intent is not a discussion of the news from Haiti, but rather to present another Latin American case of crisis of leadership in the absence of strong government. As is often the case in developing democracies, the benefit of kicking out an underperforming leader must be weighed against the damage done to the process of institutionalizing the legitmacy of leadership positions. On the one hand, it is certainly a good idea to toss out poor leaders, but that should not be the default action taken in hard times. Although the Haitian Senate is acting within the Constitution to call Alexis in for a vote, it will likely be disruptive to any number of other policies/programs in the works. Elections to renew 1/3 of the Senate have been delayed since November, and still have yet to be scheduled, and the government is scheduled to host a high profile International Donors Conference at the end of the month - these important events can only suffer with a government shake-up.

In other words, the removal of Alexis may do no more than buy President Preval a bit of time to try to come up with a fix to the food crisis, but this may come at the cost of other forward-looking initatives. Bravo to the Haitians for going out and protesting their legitimate concerns, but it is unfortunate that the political answer to the crisis may serve to set back other much-needed concerns.

Stronger Leaders, Weaker Institutions

Following on El Hidalgo 22’s post on Haiti, which ended with a reflection on the interaction between leaders and institutions, I would like to elaborate on some factors that contribute to strengthen the reliance of Latin American people on leaders instead of institutions.

In this post, I will focus on two sets of interconnected factors that contribute to the emergence of strong leaders who will in turn hinder institution-building processes. The first is the convergence of a historical tradition of caudillos and persistent inequality and exclusion. The second is the decline of traditional mediators between leaders and followers such as political parties and the increasing importance of media for politics.

Historically, Caudillos have played important roles in the social and political evolution of Latin American countries. The tradition of caudillismo that took shape when political institutions were considerably weak or non-existent and it moved forward well into the twentieth century and, it could be argued, nowadays. A quick overview of Latin American History reveals the presence of such strong leaders at any given point. These leaders, either at the national level or more locally, have not contributed to developing institutions given the relationship they establish with their followers. Using Weber’s typology of authority, caudillos are charismatic leaders that present themselves as a messiah that will solve the problems of their followers in order to gain supporters. These leaders will not pursue the strengthening of institutions as that could undermine their power.

However, caudillos would only be able to present themselves as the saviors if there is a problem upon their possible followers, to which they can offer a solution. Here, consistent social exclusion, poverty and inequality come into play. As constant problems in Latin America, the chances for leaders offering solutions to emerge are high.

On the other side, as a more recent trend we have the decline of traditional mediators between leaders and followers such as political parties and labor unions.

The relationship between leaders and followers is a two-way avenue in which the leaders must send across messages to their followers while at the same time, the latter need to express their needs, concerns and opinions to the former. During a significant part of the twentieth century, this role was performed by institutions such as political parties and labor unions, as they channeled back and forth the messages from one side to the other. With the crisis of representation and disenfranchisement of citizens from politics and political parties, these institutions are no longer able to provide mediation. Yet, political leaders have found in the media a more direct link with their followers. This link allows individuals, more so than institutions, to directly address the people, thus hindering the emergence and strengthening of institutions.

These two sets of interactions are definitely the only factors accountable for the constant emergence of caudillo-type leaders in Latin America, however, their share for such emergence is important.

How much do you think Fidel's sweatsuit would go for on EBAY?

One cannot call themselves a serious student of Latin America or democracy if they fail to consider the impact of Fidel’s “resignation” on Cuba’s future. On the surface, the event means little. In fact, the owner of the Caribbean’s most famous beard relegated himself to wearing sweatsuits and authoring op-eds for the last year and a half. Thus, other than the fabrication of new business cards and stationary for Comrade Raúl, little has changed. However, I think if one thinks of the longer term; Castro’s resignation may mark the beginning of Cuba’s transition to democracy.

I sincerely doubt that there will ever be what Jorge Domínguez has called, a “poof moment” in Cuba’s history. That is, there will never be a day when all of a sudden the dictatorship collapses and democracy begins. Instead, the transition will be slow moving. Opening will occur but not at the pace that Washington or the exile community in Miami desires. Understanding this, it is obvious that the U.S. embargo is an ineffective tool to help speed democratization. In fact, with the full force of U.S. policy against it, the regime has survived. This leaves Washington with zero leverage on the island.

Throughout Cuba’s slow transition toward democracy; reformers will emerge within the regime and popular pressure will encourage reform. Moreover, FDI and commercial interests can serve to strengthen such actors and validate the value of the free market. Nonetheless, until Cuba is a full-fledged western-style democracy, the U.S. will be a mere bystander.

Indeed as various analysts have noted, the transition will most likely resemble that of China. There, the international community is able to make credible threats because they have credible investments that can be withdrawn. As such, they are occasionally able to drive change. Beyond the fact that the embargo is inhumane, immoral, and hypocritical the U.S. should normalize relations with Cuba so that it can help to shape change and deliver a dose of democracy that the island’s residents deserve.

In consequence, Castro’s resignation is insignificant. It is an official end to a role that was already finished. Nonetheless, it marks a key moment in which the hardest of hardliners has now left the regime. Raúl seems more approachable and perhaps even reform minded; overall the opportunity offers a new U.S. administration the chance to engage and encourage the island’s democratic transition.

Meanwhile, if Raul is interested in establishing relations with the U.S., he must be willing to give something up - all those political prisoners might be a good place to start.

The historic event that is almost a political no-event

Among the several ways to look at Castro's decision to step down as Cuba's president and commander in chief of the armed forces, I would like to add an entry that looks forward, to whether this is means a real political change in the short term and some of its implications. I am posting here a piece that I wrote as part of my Latin America Analysis for Eurasia Group, the leading political risk analysis consulting firm in the US, a few days ago.

The 18 February announcement from Fidel Castro that he was stepping down as chief of state and head of the armed forces is a historic event, but does not presage major political or economic changes in the near term. It instead marks the end the political succession process that began 19 months ago when Fidel’s illness was first publicized. The announcement does, however, open the door to some changes in the style and substance of governance, Fidel’s younger brother Raul is more pragmatic, and lacks Fidel’s charisma and political authority.

The Castros have staged a peaceful and controlled transfer of power. Raul is set to be confirmed as head of state and the military by the National Assembly on 24 February, although he may not take all the political positions that Fidel held, including head of the Communist Party. Nevertheless, Raul will have a strong grip on the key political and security structures.

Unlike Fidel’s individual approach to governance, Raul will continue to incorporate other important political actors into the decision-making process. This power sharing has included prominent members of the armed forces and younger cadres. Carlos Lage, who is a key actor in economic policy and acts as the effective prime minister, is a clear example of the latter.

Raul’s apparent pragmatism will help him address the government’s main challenge: improving the population’s material conditions, while maintaining political control. Raul is no reformer,
but he has already publicly recognized the shortcomings of the Cuban economy, called for an improvement in wages and food distribution, and launched a new debate over the economy. He also established a salary-based incentive scheme to improve the efficiency of some state-owned companies the military controls. These steps have raised expectations and will probably require
some policy action in the short to medium term, such as addressing the dwindling
food supply.

Raul will face constraints that will prevent major short-term economic liberalization. While Fidel is ceding day-to-day control, his personal authority will continue and he is expected to play an important behind-the-scenes role. If recent speeches are any indication, he will oppose major changes. Moreover, the government—in conjunction with the military—still controls all key areas of the economy. The military controls at least 30% of state-owned firms, including those that dominate the tourist, agricultural, and construction sectors. Younger cadres, including Lage, meanwhile control the oil and mining sectors. Finally, there is little pressure on the government to modify policies in order to attract foreign investment, as long as current investment from Venezuela, China, Canada, and the EU brings in enough hard currency.

In short, the post-Fidel power structure in Cuba will be stable in the near term. But the distribution of portfolios in the government will signal the extent to which the new leadership will modify its policies to address the current social, political, and economic circumstances.

Will history absolve him?

OK, I haven't read the speech, but it's a good question to start off with, and I wonder if Fidel has asked himself the question recently.

My answer to the question is "no," with a "but." No, history will not absolve Fidel of his larger body of work, the totalitarian Cuban state as we know it. But he should also be remembered for doing a service to the Cuban people by tossing out Batista. Does this make up for 49 years and counting of his brand of totalitarianism? No. When he overthrew the government with popular support in 1959 did he tell anyone that in a few years he'd go back on his plan to hold elections and instead favor repressive Communism? No. Had he told his supporters that that this would be the lasting legacy of the Revolution, would he have had the support that he did? Well I leave that one open.

Fidel has always been a dilemma for liberal-minded folks because he's not as bloodthirsty or overtly personally consumptive of public resources as some of his bretheren in the Latin American and Communist dictator circles. (Well when those are your friends, I suppose the bar is pretty low.) And of course there's the healthcare and education (see Luis' post). But I've always thought that one's revolutionary credentials are tarnished if revolting against the Revolution by peaceful means (i.e. the through the ballot or MLK-style) is actively suppressed, no matter how long one wears a scruffy beard and fatigues.

So in the context of the speech given in 1953 after the Moncada attack, OK, sure, throw off the shackles of wretched oppression, I'm with you to an extent - absolve away. But he went on to substitute one lousy regime for another, which in my opinion is desabsolviable.

Fidel Castro

So Fidel decided not to run for president this time, leaving his brother Raul in charge. For people who follow Latin America, as avidly as the contributors of this blog do, this is one of the most expected moments, if not the most, in the History we hoped to witness. And this is not a politically or ideologically biased thought, we all knew that somehow, sometime, Fidel’s rule was going to end, inevitably. Given the timing, we knew that such moment was not afar. However, until recently, the current situation was not foreseen, instead, we all were waiting for his death.

This is a time for analysis and reflections. Doubtlessly, there will be an avalanche of assessments on this or that aspects. What are the implications of Fidel’s decision on the Island, the region, the hemisphere, etc? What will happen next? Is he really stepping down, or will he pull the strings from the backstage?

For anyone who considers or would like to consider him/herself a Latin Americanist, the time that will be devoted to read, write, talk about this issue will be considerable. Due to this, and my limited knowledge on the subject I would only to briefly touch on two issues that will certainly be addressed more in depth elsewhere. I would like to provide some food for thought, so to speak.

Despite all deficiencies that can be highlighted about Fidel’s regime, there are two issues I would like to remark: education and health. Cuba is a highly educated society with a quite healthy population. These two factors have been constantly signaled as crucial factors for development (see for instance this new report by the World Bank). The question I wish to put in the table is whether Cuba, entering a new stage, will be able to capitalize these factors in order to catch up in the development race.

The second issue relates to the timing of Fidel in announcing his decision in relation to the elections in the US. Had Fidel announced his decision two-three years ago, the resonance within the US agenda would have been considerably lower. Not only US foreign policy was driven by the war in Iraq and instability in the middle-east, but the Bush’s administration reluctance to approach Cuba could have limited the impact of such announcement. In contrast, given the electoral campaigns, “The Cuba Question” (see earlier post by Mainer Chris) will become quite relevant, particularly, if Raul attempts approaching the US.

Leadership and Institutions in Haiti

It's no secret that Haiti's political institutions are exceedingly weak, where they exist at all. 200 years of "predatory,"* exploitative rule has left scant opportunity for even basic democratic institutions (like the legislature) to develop. Only once in 200 years has an elected president served his full term (Preval '96-'01), the judicial system is a farce, and precious little of the 1987 Constitution has ever been implemented. Recent confusion and mismanagement has led to the delay of Senate elections for an undetermined period of time. The Senate, as it is, and the Chamber of Deputies are largely facades of institutions. Senators and Deputies have no staff, no offices, no money, and few institutionalized means to spend money. Thus the members of the Haitian Parliament serve quite literally as a front-line "face" with no support behind it.


The classic balance found in developing political systems between building institutions while encouraging responsible leadership is in full display in Haiti. At the risk of oversimplification, the lack of political institutions has been a contributing factor in the disruption of Haitian democracy, whether in the form of coups or the persistance of overt corruption. The abscence of strong institutions leaves the leader du jour to operate with more discretion and less oversight or accountability. Men being men, this scenario usually leads to pilfering of public funds, new cars, expensive liquor, exoitc women, and whatever else the leader can get away with. However, on the other side of the coin is the potential that a good leader emerges, and through responsible rule, cuts through the underdeveloped institutions not for his own benefit, but for the good of the people.

I believe this to be the case in Haiti today, at least in terms of three prominent and influential leaders. President Preval has his shortcomings, but he has not shown a tendency toward exploitation or personal gain at the expense of the people. He also seems committed to cleaning up politics rather than getting drawn into the corruption that surrounds him. The head of the national police, Mario Andresol, is by all accounts a stand-up guy and above getting trapped in the nastiness of politics. The newly elected president of the Senate, Kely Bastien of the president's Lespwa coalition, has legitimately worked his way up the political ladder, amid a Senate rife with accusations of corruption and illegal business practices. I think that this quality in leadership has had a positve effect in the progress made in Haiti in the past few years.

The paradox is that this reinforces the need to build political institutions. (With enormous international effort propping the country up), these individuals have risen to Haiti's political apex. But individual leaders who respect democratic practices are inherently limited in the time they have to affect and make policy. Therefore, to ensure continuity of their reform policies, responsible leaders, paradoxically, should do all they can to develop institutions that serve to 'check' whims or (self-benefiting) preferences of individuals and encourage the benefits of playing the democratic game.

I suspect that a significant part of Haiti's recent progress has to do with responsible leadership (from Preval, Andresol, the heads of myriad international groups, etc.). While this is good for the here-and-now, one wonders if this stability rests too much on the shoulders of a few leaders, and what this holds for the future. Established institutions bring predictability; reliance on the qualities of individual leaders brings ...... well I guess we'll see.


(* not sure who coined the phrase "predatory rule," but I find it very appropriate. Robert Fatton, a Haiti scholar uses it a lot in his work.)

After RCTV, TVes...do Venezuelans see improvements?

My first posting in this blog about Latin America will be on one of my favorite topics, the media and its relationship with the government. As this is a quite broad issue—particularly in Latin America there is plenty to explore in this regard—I will focus on one of the most controversial cases in many years related to the interaction between government and media organizations: Radio Caracas Television better known as RCTV. To be precise, I will focus on the aftermath of RCTV’s signal, which became TVes.

RCTV is one of the three big Venezuelan privately owned television networks—being Globovision and Venevision the other two—and until recently, probably the most popular. With more than 50 years broadcasting throughout Venezuela, RCTV was in the spotlight after the government decided not to renew their broadcasting license, thus hindering them from reaching all Venezuelan TV sets. On May 27, 2007, RCTV’s signal was shut down from the radioelectric spectrum triggering an avalanche of reactions from all sides of the other spectrum—the political one.

Given the relevance of the subject and its implications, I believe that the debate on whether the Venezuelan government did right or wrong should continue. Hardly argued is the importance of the media for these days’ political processes, hence the need for further debate; unfortunately, the current polarization around Venezuela makes it difficult to find coherent and impartial views.

Aware of this challenge, in this post I will not attempt to solve the RCTV case or even get near to it—that I will do some other time. Instead, I would like to bring forth a recent study conducted by Andres Cañizales from the Universidad Catolica Andres Bello, Caracas, where his team measured the degree to which the main TV channels portrayed the December ‘07 referendum as something positive, negative or neutral.

As the levels of polarization in Venezuela are extremely high, it is not surprising that the main private broadcasting stations heavily supported the NO. Meanwhile, it is not surprising that the traditional state owned station VTV supported the SI with the same vehemence. What is noteworthy is the fact that TVes also supported the SI at similar levels as VTV.

When TVes was created, it was argued that it would serve the public in order to provide voice to all Venezuelans (see a note from Telesur and a note from Venezuelanalisis). As the minister of communication said, TVes would be a public station in contrast to a government station. In other words, the new station was to be independent from the government.

The fact that TVes, according to Cañizales research, served the government and not the public—by providing a biased coverage towards the SI, instead of a neutral one— only delegitimizes the government decision to deny the renewal of RCTV’s license. RCTV’s support for the coup and the damages to democracy was the argument for denying the renewal. Unfortunately, the new channel, with its blatant government bias does little to enhance democracy.

the Cuba question: where the candidates stand

I, like many (United States of...) Americans have had a hard time not getting swept up in the frenzied presidential primary season. It wasn't until late last week that I first began to wonder about what the positions of the various candidates towards Latin America might be. Predictably, after a quick google search, the bulk (read: ALL that I have been able to find) of the Latin America related primary information has to do with the candidates positions on Cuba. I have to have a pretty good reason to visit the extreme right-wing Cuban American National Foundation's website, but as it turns out they house some of the most interesting direct responses from the democratic candidates on Cuba. These responses are from a questionnaire sent to all candidates by CANF, but only responded to by both Obama and Clinton. A quick comparison yields the a couple of conclusions regarding the policy differences between Obama and Clinton:

First, Barack does not support Television Martí, saying that although he supports Radio Martí, it's television equivalent does not reach the island as its signal is jammed by the Cuban government and therefore is not a wise way to invest the hard earned money of US taxpayers. Sounds reasonable to me, and this is not the first time I have heard that Television Martí is essentially broadcasting to nobody.

Secondly, and this is the most important of the distinctions in my view, Obama supports open dialogue with Raul once Fidel passes away. Moreover, he does not support the US imposing terms or concessions on any negotiation or dialogue between the US and Cuba. Specifically he answered NO to the following question: "Should the United States require a new Cuban government to make concessions such as freeing political prisoners or allowing a free press before the United States moves to negotiate with them?" To me this echoes a sentiment of JFK's that I heard Obama use last night in his speech across the Potomac in Virginia - "you should never negotiate out of fear, but you should never fear to negotiate". Clinton on the other hand appears to favor a bit more hard line position, opposing negotiation with Raul after Fidel's death and requiring concessions for dialogue.

I won't cut and paste each candidates whole Cuba statement, but the links to their questionaire responses and statements are here:
Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton

Unfortunately John McCain did not submit any answers to the questionnaire although word on the street seems to be that he leans towards the hardliners (not surprising). I read in the Baltimore Sun that McCain was on the USS Enterprise, which was the first aircraft carrier sent to Cuba to circle the island during the Cuban Missile Crisis, because it was nuclear capable. Nevertheless, there seems to be some suspicion in the most conservative sectors of the Cuban-American community that McCain is soft on commies due to his early advocacy of normalizing relations with Vietnam.

It will certainly be interesting to see as the primary season continues and morphs into the general election, how latin america will appear or not on the issue radars of the presumptive nominees.

ps. photo credit goes to: http://voteforbreakfast.com/images/barack_sings.jpg

Marcha contra las FARC

Yesterday, February 4th, the largest popular mobilization of Colombians in that country's history took place. As pointed out in El Tiempo's special section titled "Asi se vivio la marcha contra las FARC" Colombians all over the world participated to collectively voice a round rejection of kidnapping, violence, lies, and most vociferously, the armed rebel group FARC. While the largest gathering was in Bogota, with more than a million marchers, there were public demonstrations of support in several cities in the US and elsewhere (I even saw photos of Colombians waving signs in Kurdistan -- impressive), including Washington. I was in attendance yesterday, albeit with mixed feelings. My feelings were mixed for several reasons, the most easily expressed being the following: I didn't/don't disagree with any of the official reasons for gathering - in fact I readily embrace a repudiation of kidnapping, the horrific violence perpetrated by the FARC, and the stranglehold that they have on Colombians ability to feel safe in their own country. That said, I feel strongly about several issues that seemed to be omitted from the platform yesterday, most importantly the rejection of ALL violence and kidnapping in Colombia, including those acts perpetrated by paramilitaries, the ELN, and state forces. I am not foolish enough to get into an argument with Colombians about who commits the greatest number, or most heinous atrocities, mostly because I sincerely feel that accurately apportioning blame should take a back seat to a much more important duty we all have of denouncing violence anywhere and in all it's forms.

It was a privilege to witness a truly grass roots mobilization of a people fed up with a senseless civil war and a country in which a vast majority is deprived of peace by a greedy and vicious minority...

update 2/10/08 : i meant to finish my post after class, did not get around to it, and now have some updates that affect what i was intending to write in my concluding thoughts. Tonight I received an invitation to participate in a March 6 march to voice a rejection of violence, kidnapping, and terror perpetrated by paramilitary forces, often times in collusion with the government. My hopes are that this march will be take place with similar levels of tolerance and without explicitly party political messages as characterized the anti-FARC march.....we'll see.