Stronger Leaders, Weaker Institutions

Following on El Hidalgo 22’s post on Haiti, which ended with a reflection on the interaction between leaders and institutions, I would like to elaborate on some factors that contribute to strengthen the reliance of Latin American people on leaders instead of institutions.

In this post, I will focus on two sets of interconnected factors that contribute to the emergence of strong leaders who will in turn hinder institution-building processes. The first is the convergence of a historical tradition of caudillos and persistent inequality and exclusion. The second is the decline of traditional mediators between leaders and followers such as political parties and the increasing importance of media for politics.

Historically, Caudillos have played important roles in the social and political evolution of Latin American countries. The tradition of caudillismo that took shape when political institutions were considerably weak or non-existent and it moved forward well into the twentieth century and, it could be argued, nowadays. A quick overview of Latin American History reveals the presence of such strong leaders at any given point. These leaders, either at the national level or more locally, have not contributed to developing institutions given the relationship they establish with their followers. Using Weber’s typology of authority, caudillos are charismatic leaders that present themselves as a messiah that will solve the problems of their followers in order to gain supporters. These leaders will not pursue the strengthening of institutions as that could undermine their power.

However, caudillos would only be able to present themselves as the saviors if there is a problem upon their possible followers, to which they can offer a solution. Here, consistent social exclusion, poverty and inequality come into play. As constant problems in Latin America, the chances for leaders offering solutions to emerge are high.

On the other side, as a more recent trend we have the decline of traditional mediators between leaders and followers such as political parties and labor unions.

The relationship between leaders and followers is a two-way avenue in which the leaders must send across messages to their followers while at the same time, the latter need to express their needs, concerns and opinions to the former. During a significant part of the twentieth century, this role was performed by institutions such as political parties and labor unions, as they channeled back and forth the messages from one side to the other. With the crisis of representation and disenfranchisement of citizens from politics and political parties, these institutions are no longer able to provide mediation. Yet, political leaders have found in the media a more direct link with their followers. This link allows individuals, more so than institutions, to directly address the people, thus hindering the emergence and strengthening of institutions.

These two sets of interactions are definitely the only factors accountable for the constant emergence of caudillo-type leaders in Latin America, however, their share for such emergence is important.

How much do you think Fidel's sweatsuit would go for on EBAY?

One cannot call themselves a serious student of Latin America or democracy if they fail to consider the impact of Fidel’s “resignation” on Cuba’s future. On the surface, the event means little. In fact, the owner of the Caribbean’s most famous beard relegated himself to wearing sweatsuits and authoring op-eds for the last year and a half. Thus, other than the fabrication of new business cards and stationary for Comrade Raúl, little has changed. However, I think if one thinks of the longer term; Castro’s resignation may mark the beginning of Cuba’s transition to democracy.

I sincerely doubt that there will ever be what Jorge Domínguez has called, a “poof moment” in Cuba’s history. That is, there will never be a day when all of a sudden the dictatorship collapses and democracy begins. Instead, the transition will be slow moving. Opening will occur but not at the pace that Washington or the exile community in Miami desires. Understanding this, it is obvious that the U.S. embargo is an ineffective tool to help speed democratization. In fact, with the full force of U.S. policy against it, the regime has survived. This leaves Washington with zero leverage on the island.

Throughout Cuba’s slow transition toward democracy; reformers will emerge within the regime and popular pressure will encourage reform. Moreover, FDI and commercial interests can serve to strengthen such actors and validate the value of the free market. Nonetheless, until Cuba is a full-fledged western-style democracy, the U.S. will be a mere bystander.

Indeed as various analysts have noted, the transition will most likely resemble that of China. There, the international community is able to make credible threats because they have credible investments that can be withdrawn. As such, they are occasionally able to drive change. Beyond the fact that the embargo is inhumane, immoral, and hypocritical the U.S. should normalize relations with Cuba so that it can help to shape change and deliver a dose of democracy that the island’s residents deserve.

In consequence, Castro’s resignation is insignificant. It is an official end to a role that was already finished. Nonetheless, it marks a key moment in which the hardest of hardliners has now left the regime. Raúl seems more approachable and perhaps even reform minded; overall the opportunity offers a new U.S. administration the chance to engage and encourage the island’s democratic transition.

Meanwhile, if Raul is interested in establishing relations with the U.S., he must be willing to give something up - all those political prisoners might be a good place to start.