The historic event that is almost a political no-event

Among the several ways to look at Castro's decision to step down as Cuba's president and commander in chief of the armed forces, I would like to add an entry that looks forward, to whether this is means a real political change in the short term and some of its implications. I am posting here a piece that I wrote as part of my Latin America Analysis for Eurasia Group, the leading political risk analysis consulting firm in the US, a few days ago.

The 18 February announcement from Fidel Castro that he was stepping down as chief of state and head of the armed forces is a historic event, but does not presage major political or economic changes in the near term. It instead marks the end the political succession process that began 19 months ago when Fidel’s illness was first publicized. The announcement does, however, open the door to some changes in the style and substance of governance, Fidel’s younger brother Raul is more pragmatic, and lacks Fidel’s charisma and political authority.

The Castros have staged a peaceful and controlled transfer of power. Raul is set to be confirmed as head of state and the military by the National Assembly on 24 February, although he may not take all the political positions that Fidel held, including head of the Communist Party. Nevertheless, Raul will have a strong grip on the key political and security structures.

Unlike Fidel’s individual approach to governance, Raul will continue to incorporate other important political actors into the decision-making process. This power sharing has included prominent members of the armed forces and younger cadres. Carlos Lage, who is a key actor in economic policy and acts as the effective prime minister, is a clear example of the latter.

Raul’s apparent pragmatism will help him address the government’s main challenge: improving the population’s material conditions, while maintaining political control. Raul is no reformer,
but he has already publicly recognized the shortcomings of the Cuban economy, called for an improvement in wages and food distribution, and launched a new debate over the economy. He also established a salary-based incentive scheme to improve the efficiency of some state-owned companies the military controls. These steps have raised expectations and will probably require
some policy action in the short to medium term, such as addressing the dwindling
food supply.

Raul will face constraints that will prevent major short-term economic liberalization. While Fidel is ceding day-to-day control, his personal authority will continue and he is expected to play an important behind-the-scenes role. If recent speeches are any indication, he will oppose major changes. Moreover, the government—in conjunction with the military—still controls all key areas of the economy. The military controls at least 30% of state-owned firms, including those that dominate the tourist, agricultural, and construction sectors. Younger cadres, including Lage, meanwhile control the oil and mining sectors. Finally, there is little pressure on the government to modify policies in order to attract foreign investment, as long as current investment from Venezuela, China, Canada, and the EU brings in enough hard currency.

In short, the post-Fidel power structure in Cuba will be stable in the near term. But the distribution of portfolios in the government will signal the extent to which the new leadership will modify its policies to address the current social, political, and economic circumstances.

Will history absolve him?

OK, I haven't read the speech, but it's a good question to start off with, and I wonder if Fidel has asked himself the question recently.

My answer to the question is "no," with a "but." No, history will not absolve Fidel of his larger body of work, the totalitarian Cuban state as we know it. But he should also be remembered for doing a service to the Cuban people by tossing out Batista. Does this make up for 49 years and counting of his brand of totalitarianism? No. When he overthrew the government with popular support in 1959 did he tell anyone that in a few years he'd go back on his plan to hold elections and instead favor repressive Communism? No. Had he told his supporters that that this would be the lasting legacy of the Revolution, would he have had the support that he did? Well I leave that one open.

Fidel has always been a dilemma for liberal-minded folks because he's not as bloodthirsty or overtly personally consumptive of public resources as some of his bretheren in the Latin American and Communist dictator circles. (Well when those are your friends, I suppose the bar is pretty low.) And of course there's the healthcare and education (see Luis' post). But I've always thought that one's revolutionary credentials are tarnished if revolting against the Revolution by peaceful means (i.e. the through the ballot or MLK-style) is actively suppressed, no matter how long one wears a scruffy beard and fatigues.

So in the context of the speech given in 1953 after the Moncada attack, OK, sure, throw off the shackles of wretched oppression, I'm with you to an extent - absolve away. But he went on to substitute one lousy regime for another, which in my opinion is desabsolviable.

Fidel Castro

So Fidel decided not to run for president this time, leaving his brother Raul in charge. For people who follow Latin America, as avidly as the contributors of this blog do, this is one of the most expected moments, if not the most, in the History we hoped to witness. And this is not a politically or ideologically biased thought, we all knew that somehow, sometime, Fidel’s rule was going to end, inevitably. Given the timing, we knew that such moment was not afar. However, until recently, the current situation was not foreseen, instead, we all were waiting for his death.

This is a time for analysis and reflections. Doubtlessly, there will be an avalanche of assessments on this or that aspects. What are the implications of Fidel’s decision on the Island, the region, the hemisphere, etc? What will happen next? Is he really stepping down, or will he pull the strings from the backstage?

For anyone who considers or would like to consider him/herself a Latin Americanist, the time that will be devoted to read, write, talk about this issue will be considerable. Due to this, and my limited knowledge on the subject I would only to briefly touch on two issues that will certainly be addressed more in depth elsewhere. I would like to provide some food for thought, so to speak.

Despite all deficiencies that can be highlighted about Fidel’s regime, there are two issues I would like to remark: education and health. Cuba is a highly educated society with a quite healthy population. These two factors have been constantly signaled as crucial factors for development (see for instance this new report by the World Bank). The question I wish to put in the table is whether Cuba, entering a new stage, will be able to capitalize these factors in order to catch up in the development race.

The second issue relates to the timing of Fidel in announcing his decision in relation to the elections in the US. Had Fidel announced his decision two-three years ago, the resonance within the US agenda would have been considerably lower. Not only US foreign policy was driven by the war in Iraq and instability in the middle-east, but the Bush’s administration reluctance to approach Cuba could have limited the impact of such announcement. In contrast, given the electoral campaigns, “The Cuba Question” (see earlier post by Mainer Chris) will become quite relevant, particularly, if Raul attempts approaching the US.

Leadership and Institutions in Haiti

It's no secret that Haiti's political institutions are exceedingly weak, where they exist at all. 200 years of "predatory,"* exploitative rule has left scant opportunity for even basic democratic institutions (like the legislature) to develop. Only once in 200 years has an elected president served his full term (Preval '96-'01), the judicial system is a farce, and precious little of the 1987 Constitution has ever been implemented. Recent confusion and mismanagement has led to the delay of Senate elections for an undetermined period of time. The Senate, as it is, and the Chamber of Deputies are largely facades of institutions. Senators and Deputies have no staff, no offices, no money, and few institutionalized means to spend money. Thus the members of the Haitian Parliament serve quite literally as a front-line "face" with no support behind it.


The classic balance found in developing political systems between building institutions while encouraging responsible leadership is in full display in Haiti. At the risk of oversimplification, the lack of political institutions has been a contributing factor in the disruption of Haitian democracy, whether in the form of coups or the persistance of overt corruption. The abscence of strong institutions leaves the leader du jour to operate with more discretion and less oversight or accountability. Men being men, this scenario usually leads to pilfering of public funds, new cars, expensive liquor, exoitc women, and whatever else the leader can get away with. However, on the other side of the coin is the potential that a good leader emerges, and through responsible rule, cuts through the underdeveloped institutions not for his own benefit, but for the good of the people.

I believe this to be the case in Haiti today, at least in terms of three prominent and influential leaders. President Preval has his shortcomings, but he has not shown a tendency toward exploitation or personal gain at the expense of the people. He also seems committed to cleaning up politics rather than getting drawn into the corruption that surrounds him. The head of the national police, Mario Andresol, is by all accounts a stand-up guy and above getting trapped in the nastiness of politics. The newly elected president of the Senate, Kely Bastien of the president's Lespwa coalition, has legitimately worked his way up the political ladder, amid a Senate rife with accusations of corruption and illegal business practices. I think that this quality in leadership has had a positve effect in the progress made in Haiti in the past few years.

The paradox is that this reinforces the need to build political institutions. (With enormous international effort propping the country up), these individuals have risen to Haiti's political apex. But individual leaders who respect democratic practices are inherently limited in the time they have to affect and make policy. Therefore, to ensure continuity of their reform policies, responsible leaders, paradoxically, should do all they can to develop institutions that serve to 'check' whims or (self-benefiting) preferences of individuals and encourage the benefits of playing the democratic game.

I suspect that a significant part of Haiti's recent progress has to do with responsible leadership (from Preval, Andresol, the heads of myriad international groups, etc.). While this is good for the here-and-now, one wonders if this stability rests too much on the shoulders of a few leaders, and what this holds for the future. Established institutions bring predictability; reliance on the qualities of individual leaders brings ...... well I guess we'll see.


(* not sure who coined the phrase "predatory rule," but I find it very appropriate. Robert Fatton, a Haiti scholar uses it a lot in his work.)

After RCTV, TVes...do Venezuelans see improvements?

My first posting in this blog about Latin America will be on one of my favorite topics, the media and its relationship with the government. As this is a quite broad issue—particularly in Latin America there is plenty to explore in this regard—I will focus on one of the most controversial cases in many years related to the interaction between government and media organizations: Radio Caracas Television better known as RCTV. To be precise, I will focus on the aftermath of RCTV’s signal, which became TVes.

RCTV is one of the three big Venezuelan privately owned television networks—being Globovision and Venevision the other two—and until recently, probably the most popular. With more than 50 years broadcasting throughout Venezuela, RCTV was in the spotlight after the government decided not to renew their broadcasting license, thus hindering them from reaching all Venezuelan TV sets. On May 27, 2007, RCTV’s signal was shut down from the radioelectric spectrum triggering an avalanche of reactions from all sides of the other spectrum—the political one.

Given the relevance of the subject and its implications, I believe that the debate on whether the Venezuelan government did right or wrong should continue. Hardly argued is the importance of the media for these days’ political processes, hence the need for further debate; unfortunately, the current polarization around Venezuela makes it difficult to find coherent and impartial views.

Aware of this challenge, in this post I will not attempt to solve the RCTV case or even get near to it—that I will do some other time. Instead, I would like to bring forth a recent study conducted by Andres Cañizales from the Universidad Catolica Andres Bello, Caracas, where his team measured the degree to which the main TV channels portrayed the December ‘07 referendum as something positive, negative or neutral.

As the levels of polarization in Venezuela are extremely high, it is not surprising that the main private broadcasting stations heavily supported the NO. Meanwhile, it is not surprising that the traditional state owned station VTV supported the SI with the same vehemence. What is noteworthy is the fact that TVes also supported the SI at similar levels as VTV.

When TVes was created, it was argued that it would serve the public in order to provide voice to all Venezuelans (see a note from Telesur and a note from Venezuelanalisis). As the minister of communication said, TVes would be a public station in contrast to a government station. In other words, the new station was to be independent from the government.

The fact that TVes, according to Cañizales research, served the government and not the public—by providing a biased coverage towards the SI, instead of a neutral one— only delegitimizes the government decision to deny the renewal of RCTV’s license. RCTV’s support for the coup and the damages to democracy was the argument for denying the renewal. Unfortunately, the new channel, with its blatant government bias does little to enhance democracy.

the Cuba question: where the candidates stand

I, like many (United States of...) Americans have had a hard time not getting swept up in the frenzied presidential primary season. It wasn't until late last week that I first began to wonder about what the positions of the various candidates towards Latin America might be. Predictably, after a quick google search, the bulk (read: ALL that I have been able to find) of the Latin America related primary information has to do with the candidates positions on Cuba. I have to have a pretty good reason to visit the extreme right-wing Cuban American National Foundation's website, but as it turns out they house some of the most interesting direct responses from the democratic candidates on Cuba. These responses are from a questionnaire sent to all candidates by CANF, but only responded to by both Obama and Clinton. A quick comparison yields the a couple of conclusions regarding the policy differences between Obama and Clinton:

First, Barack does not support Television Martí, saying that although he supports Radio Martí, it's television equivalent does not reach the island as its signal is jammed by the Cuban government and therefore is not a wise way to invest the hard earned money of US taxpayers. Sounds reasonable to me, and this is not the first time I have heard that Television Martí is essentially broadcasting to nobody.

Secondly, and this is the most important of the distinctions in my view, Obama supports open dialogue with Raul once Fidel passes away. Moreover, he does not support the US imposing terms or concessions on any negotiation or dialogue between the US and Cuba. Specifically he answered NO to the following question: "Should the United States require a new Cuban government to make concessions such as freeing political prisoners or allowing a free press before the United States moves to negotiate with them?" To me this echoes a sentiment of JFK's that I heard Obama use last night in his speech across the Potomac in Virginia - "you should never negotiate out of fear, but you should never fear to negotiate". Clinton on the other hand appears to favor a bit more hard line position, opposing negotiation with Raul after Fidel's death and requiring concessions for dialogue.

I won't cut and paste each candidates whole Cuba statement, but the links to their questionaire responses and statements are here:
Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton

Unfortunately John McCain did not submit any answers to the questionnaire although word on the street seems to be that he leans towards the hardliners (not surprising). I read in the Baltimore Sun that McCain was on the USS Enterprise, which was the first aircraft carrier sent to Cuba to circle the island during the Cuban Missile Crisis, because it was nuclear capable. Nevertheless, there seems to be some suspicion in the most conservative sectors of the Cuban-American community that McCain is soft on commies due to his early advocacy of normalizing relations with Vietnam.

It will certainly be interesting to see as the primary season continues and morphs into the general election, how latin america will appear or not on the issue radars of the presumptive nominees.

ps. photo credit goes to: http://voteforbreakfast.com/images/barack_sings.jpg

Marcha contra las FARC

Yesterday, February 4th, the largest popular mobilization of Colombians in that country's history took place. As pointed out in El Tiempo's special section titled "Asi se vivio la marcha contra las FARC" Colombians all over the world participated to collectively voice a round rejection of kidnapping, violence, lies, and most vociferously, the armed rebel group FARC. While the largest gathering was in Bogota, with more than a million marchers, there were public demonstrations of support in several cities in the US and elsewhere (I even saw photos of Colombians waving signs in Kurdistan -- impressive), including Washington. I was in attendance yesterday, albeit with mixed feelings. My feelings were mixed for several reasons, the most easily expressed being the following: I didn't/don't disagree with any of the official reasons for gathering - in fact I readily embrace a repudiation of kidnapping, the horrific violence perpetrated by the FARC, and the stranglehold that they have on Colombians ability to feel safe in their own country. That said, I feel strongly about several issues that seemed to be omitted from the platform yesterday, most importantly the rejection of ALL violence and kidnapping in Colombia, including those acts perpetrated by paramilitaries, the ELN, and state forces. I am not foolish enough to get into an argument with Colombians about who commits the greatest number, or most heinous atrocities, mostly because I sincerely feel that accurately apportioning blame should take a back seat to a much more important duty we all have of denouncing violence anywhere and in all it's forms.

It was a privilege to witness a truly grass roots mobilization of a people fed up with a senseless civil war and a country in which a vast majority is deprived of peace by a greedy and vicious minority...

update 2/10/08 : i meant to finish my post after class, did not get around to it, and now have some updates that affect what i was intending to write in my concluding thoughts. Tonight I received an invitation to participate in a March 6 march to voice a rejection of violence, kidnapping, and terror perpetrated by paramilitary forces, often times in collusion with the government. My hopes are that this march will be take place with similar levels of tolerance and without explicitly party political messages as characterized the anti-FARC march.....we'll see.